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Abstract 
 
The subject of the paper is to investigate the relationship between 
audit quality and its factors (including the audit client size, capital 
structure, audit fees, non-audit service fees, Big 4, firm tenure and 
cash from operations) during the financial crisis. The data of FTSE 100 
from 2007 to 2011 will be selected as a sample for the study. Here the 
discretionary accruals as the proxy for audit quality will be calculated 
by Jones model and modified Jones model. Based on the prior studies, 
the regression model will be used to research the study. After the data 
and results analysis, it finds that the economic conditions and the 
method that can be used to measure the discretionary accruals may 
affect the relationship between audit quality and its seven factors. The 
paper contributes to extending the research field about related 
studies. It provides a new factor of economic conditions that can be 
considered by the studies related to the audit quality. 
 
Key words: financial crisis; audit quality; UK audit market; the 
regression model 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
After the outbreak of the financial crisis, it has a negative influence on 
the global economy. People increasingly consider the topic about the 
financial crisis. Brown (1986) mentions, ÒWhenever the advance of 
civilization brought about the necessity of one man being entrusted to 
some extent with the property of another the advisability of some kind 
of check upon the fidelity of the former would become apparent.Ó This 
implies that the auditing is vital for the economic development, 
because the auditing is required before any mandatory requirements 
about auditing (Zerni, 2009). 
 
The financial crisis has caused the reduction of value of financial 
assets and bankruptcy after 2007. This proves that he crisis has 
negatively affected global economy. The issues about the financial 
crisis are very concerned by managers and shareholders. The agency 
problem exists between managers and shareholders. The auditor 
takes an important role to avoid the agency problem through 
providing high-quality audit. Therefore, the economic conditions can 
be considered, when the study about audit quality is investigated. 
Especially, the unexpected event (the financial crisis) occurs in recent 
years, because the one-off event may generate a big impact on audit 
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quality. Based on the above motivation, the report aims to investigate 
the relationship between audit quality and its factors (including the 
audit client size, capital structure of audited firms, audit fees, 
non-audit fees, Big 4, audit firm tenure and cash from operations) 
during the financial crisis. The UK audit market will be selected as a 
sample to research the topic. 
1.1 Background 
The interests of owners and managers are different, which could lead 
to the agency problem. For example, the interests of owners (such as 
shareholders) are going to get maximum profit from the firm; 
however, the interests of managers are going to get maximum bonus. 
The agency problem between owners and managers contributes to 
the requirements of auditor who can help the firm to publish fair and 
true financial information. The auditor can also help to reduce the 
information asymmetries between owners and managers within a firm, 
because the audit is independent from the management. 
 
The boards of the directors may have influence on the selection of 
auditors, and the selection of auditors can affect the audit process and 
audit quality (Abbott et al. 2002; Chen et al. 2005). It is significant 
that auditor provides high-quality audit, because high-quality audit 
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can assist shareholders to understand the truth of the firm. DeAngelo 
(1981) provides the audit quality is Òthe market assessed joint 
probability that a given auditor will both discover a breach in c clientÕs 
accounting system, and report the breach.Ó If the audit quality is high, 
it can decrease the possibility of accounting fraud and illegal reporting 
activities. 
 
Before the 1990s, the competition of UK audit market was high, and 
the audit fees were low. However, the Big 4 audit firms, which are 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DT), Ernst & Young (E&Y), 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) and KPMG, dominate the UK audit 
market in recent years. The following diagram 1 represents the 
development of the market share between 1995 and 2004. In 1997, 
the merger of the Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse happened. 
After the merger, the Big 6 became to Big 5. In 2001, the collapse of 
Arthur Andeson (AA) contributes to high audit market concentration 
of Big 4. All of the above can cause the monopoly of the Big 4 for the 
UK audit market. The monopoly of the Big 4 negatively affects the 
independence of auditor. Comunale and Sexton (2003) and Moizer et 
al. (2007) point out that there is not an increasing trend on the 
concentration of Big 4 for UK audit market. Moreover, the Ballas 
(2005) summarises that the level of concentration does not increase 
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after the demise of Andersen. Therefore, the audit competition may 
be not increasing in short term. 
 
The diagram 1.1: The development of the market share between 
1995 and 2004 
(Source: Oxera, 2006) 
 
The auditor independence that can affect the audit quality has 
become a top concern, after the Enron Scandal occurred in 2001. New 
regulations that are used to improve the auditor independence have 
been initiated. The following section will describe the regulatory of UK 
audit market that intends to improve the auditor independence and 
audit quality. 
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1.2 The regulatory of UK audit market 
In order to increasing the competition of UK audit market, the 
government planned to repeal the Auditing Committee (AC). Besides, 
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) reviewed the issue of competition 
about the UK audit market, since the merger of PWC has happened in 
1998. However, until 2011 there was no any reference made to the 
Competition Commission (CC).  
 
The Enron financial scandal contributed to creating the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX [2002]) that was designed to 
restore confidence in corporate governance. It is significant for 
auditing authorities to set up new regulations to improve the level of 
accountability, transparency, responsibility and fairness for the 
financial statement. This is to say it is important to increase the 
independence and objectivity of auditor. To improve the audit quality, 
it is vital for auditors to follow the auditing standard rules. Some 
countries (including the U.S., European Union and United Kingdom) 
have accepted a new auditing rule that stipulates a mandatory audit 
partner rotation. This implies that the government are increasing 
considering the auditor independence that can affect the audit 
quality.  
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In the UK, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) commissions the 
report on competition and choice in UK audit market. The government 
delegates the Coordinating Group on Audit and Accountancy (CGAA) 
in order to reforming regulatory environments. After current financial 
crisis, the European Commission (EC) published the Green Paper for 
the sake of adjusting the audit regulation (Response to Green Paper, 
2010).  
 
After accepting the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2), the audit fees were 
considerable increasing. There were many public firms complain the 
increasing audit fees (Johnson, 2005). To reduce audit fees, the 
PCAOB published the Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) instead of the 
AS2. Under the AS5, it uses a Òtop-down, risk-basedÓ method, and 
othersÕ work (such as management and internal auditors) can be used 
to simplify the internal control audit process (PCAOB, 2007; SEC, 
2007). Wand and Zhou (2012) found that the AS5 could decrease the 
audit fees. The Doogar et al. (2010) and Krishnan et al. (2011) 
provided the same finding. Wand and Zhou (2012) also discovered 
that even though the audit fees were going down, the audit quality did 
not be affected after changing to AS5 from AS2. Overall, this implies 
that the AS5 brings the economic benefit without the decline in audit 
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quality. This may imply that the auditing standards are always 
changing over the year to find an appropriate regulatory to control the 
UK audit market. 
1.3 The structure of the study 
The report will be divided into seven chapters. The chapter one will 
describe the motivation and background related to the study. The 
chapter two will review prior studies that are related to the 
relationship between audit quality and its factors. The chapter three 
will introduce the methodology that will be used to investigate the 
study. Within the chapter, it includes the sample collection, the 
regression models that will be established for the study and the 
hypothesis development. The data and results analysis will be 
included in the chapter four. This chapter is important for the study to 
obtain some findings. The next chapter will conclude the report. 
Within the chapter, there are two further studies are recommended. 
At the same time, the chapter will summarise the main findings for 
the study. In chapter six, it includes references. And some diagrams 
that are related to the study will be shown in the chapter seven. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
Knechel et al. (2013) say, ÒAn audit is a professional service delivered 
by experts in response to economic and regulatory demand.Ó 
Normally, there are two types of studies about audit. The one is 
related to audit fees, and another is related to audit quality. The 
subject of the report is to investigate the relationship between audit 
quality and its factors including audit client size, capital structure of 
audited firms, audit fees, non-audit fees, Big-Four, audit firm tenure 
and cash from operations during the financial crisis. In the chapter, it 
will firstly define audit quality based on different stakeholdersÕ 
viewpoints. And then it will review prior studies that have investigated 
the relationship between audit quality and its factors. 
2.1 The definition of audit quality 
To investigate the relationship between audit quality and its factors, it 
is important to understand the definition of audit quality. It is difficult 
to explain the definition of audit quality, because stakeholders 
(including the users, auditors, audit firm, regulators and society) have 
different understanding on audit quality (Knechel et al. 2013). The 
following diagram will summarise different viewpoints on audit quality 
from different stakeholders. 
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The diagram 2.1: The stakeholdersÕ views on audit quality 
The stakeholders in the 
financial reporting 
process 
Explanations on high-quality audit 
Users There are no material misstatements within 
the financial reports.  
Auditors They can complete all tasks to satisfy the 
needs required by the firmÕs audit 
methodology. 
Audit firm The audit can protect the clients from the 
court of law. 
Regulators The audit meets all requirements provided 
by professional standards. 
Society It helps a company or the related market to 
avoid economic problems. 
(Knechel et al. 2013) 
 
After analysis of the above diagram, it is difficult to get a common 
definition of audit quality. There are some existing definitions on audit 
quality. Firstly, the audit quality can be taken as an outcome 
depended on the auditorsÕ attributes. For example, DeAngelo (1981) 
thinks that audit quality is Òthe market assessed joint probability that 
a given auditor will both discover a breach in a clientÕs accounting 
system, and report the breach.Ó This implies that the auditor requires 
adequate capacity to find some misstatements on clientÕs accounting 
system, and then the auditor should report these misstatements. 
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Secondly, based on the responsibilities of the auditor, the audit 
quality can be defined within the audit process. For example, 
high-quality audit can be achieved, if the auditor follows the Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). The auditor has responsibilities 
to provide reasonable assurance that the audited financial statements 
are in line with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and there are not materially misstated within audited financial 
statements (GAO, 2003). Finally, the audit quality can be defined in 
the view of the poor audit quality that can lead to poor audit outcomes. 
However, it is difficult to find some actual cases of audit failures 
(Francis, 2011). Therefore, it is hard to research the issue of audit 
quality from this viewpoint. To sum up, there is no unified definition 
on audit quality. This report will combine the above opinions, when 
the definition of the audit quality is considered. 
2.2 Audit client size 
There is almost no research to investigate the relationship between 
audit quality and audit client size directly. There are some studies that 
have researched the influence of audit client size on independence 
and objectivity of auditor (Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Pratt and 
Stice, 1994). For example, Pratt and Stice (1994) stress that the 
professional judgment of auditor has an important role in the 
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decision-making process of audit. Normally, the auditor 
independence will decrease with the increase in the audit client size, 
because there is an inherent economic dependence of auditor on audit 
clients (DeAngelo, 1981; Mautz and Sharaf, 1961). That is to say that 
bigger audit clients can generate more fees that are paid to the 
auditor. For example, the economic dependence can be acted as a 
major factor that causes low-quality auditing report on Enron from 
Arthur Andersen (Healy and Palepu, 2003). The auditing standards 
are also considering the issue of the threat of economic dependence 
on audit dependence. For example, the Auditing Practices Board (APB) 
proposes that ÒWhere it is expected that the total fees for both audit 
and non-audit services receivable from a listed audited entity and its 
subsidiaries audited by the audit firm will regularly exceed 10% of the 
annual fee income of the audit firm, the firm shall not act as the 
auditor.Ó (APB Ethical Standard 4, 2010).  
 
The independence and objectivity of auditor are very significant to 
increase the reliability of financial statement. That is to say the both 
are vital for auditor to find material misstatements of financial 
statements (Aamir and Farooq, 2011). For example, the auditor finds 
that the financial statements are not in line with the GAAP. In the 
section 2.1, it has discussed the definition of audit quality based on 
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different views of stakeholders. If auditor can find material 
misstatements of financial statements within the audit process and 
the audited financial statements follow the GAAP, the high-quality 
audit will be obtained by the auditor. Therefore, the audit client size 
can affect the audit quality indirectly.  
 
Overall, the audit client size has a negative influence on audit 
independence, and there is a positive relationship between audit 
independence and audit quality. This implies that the audit client size 
may be negatively related to the audit quality. It is worth noting that 
even though Reynolds and Francis (2001) investigate the influence of 
audit client size on audit independence based on the information from 
Big 5 audit firms, there is no evidence to support that the economic 
dependence is positively related to the audit client size.  
 
However, there are some studies that provide larger client firm can 
cause the auditor is stricter within audit process compared with 
smaller audit clients. The reason can be that the risks of reputation 
loss and litigation are increasing larger for larger audit clients (Pierre 
and Anderson, 1981; Stice, 1991; Lys and Watts, 1994; Dye, 1993). 
When an auditor is accused of negligent auditing, this can have a 
negative influence on reputation of the auditor. Besides the negative 
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influence can be greater for larger audit clients compared with smaller 
audit clients. Within the litigation process about negligent audit, the 
auditor takes more potential costs about the litigation (Lys and Watts, 
1994; Stice, 1991). Normally, auditors charge more money (more 
premium in the audit fees) to cover the risks of reputation loss and 
litigation for larger clients (Simon, 1985; Francis and Simon, 1987). 
Therefore, the auditor is stricter within audit process for larger audit 
client. If auditor can be stricter within the audit process, the audit 
quality will be higher. It implies that the audit client size may be 
positively related to the audit quality. 
2.3 Capital structure of audited firms 
Capital structure is determined by companiesÕ financing decisions that 
can be influenced by the asymmetry of available information between 
companies and investors. If the audit quality is high, this will reduce 
the information asymmetry between companies and investors. The 
financial statement is very important to reduce the asymmetry of 
available information between companies and investors. That is to 
say that the auditors are vital to ensure the integrity of information 
and reduce the information asymmetry (Chang el al. 2009). Some 
factors can affect the capital structures, such as legal institutions. 
Companies in some countries, which have better legal institutions, 
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have more long-term debts in their capital structures compared with 
that in some countries that have relatively worse legal institutions 
(Giannetti, 2003; Fan et al. 2010). This implies that the debt maturity 
is more and more increasing with better legal institutions (Ghoul et al. 
2011). Chang et al. (2009) find firms that are audited by Big-Six audit 
firms prefer to issue equity rather than to issue debt. The behavior 
can cause low leverage. Besides the companies are more likely to 
issue larger level of equity in the circumstance of favorable market 
conditions. Chang et al. (2009) find that the leverage of audited firms 
is less influenced by market conditions, if Big-Six audit firms audit 
these firms.  
 
Normally, the Big-Four audit firms have a higher reputation compared 
with other audit firms. Besides the audit firms with higher reputation 
can provide higher-quality audit compared with other audit firms with 
lower reputation (Chang et al. 2009). There is a positive relationship 
between the level of debts in audited companies and selection of 
auditors with higher reputation (DeFond, 1992; Firth and Smith, 
1992). This implies that if the audit client has higher leverage, the 
audit quality may be higher. The agency cost, which increases the 
percentage of debts, can cause the demand for an independence audit 
(Chow, 1982). This supports the positive relationship between 
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leverage and audit quality. The study of the Einchenseher and Shields 
(1986) also find the positive relationship between the both.  
 
However, some other studies provide a completely different result 
that the level of debts in audited companies is negatively related to 
the selection of auditors with higher reputation (Simunic and Stein, 
1987; Francis and Wilson, 1988). That is to say that higher leverage 
may lead to decreasing audit quality from auditors. When audited 
firms have higher level of leverage, they may prefer to change 
auditors to relatively lower-quality auditors (Johnson and Lys, 1990; 
Healy and Lys, 1986). The Onder et al. (n.d.) provide that researchers 
should consider the location of audited firms that may affect the 
capital structure. For example, even though the borrowing costs of 
audited firms in Turkey are very high, these companies prefer high 
level of leverage due to high tax benefits. Within the situation, the 
audited firms prefer to select lenient auditors rather than strict 
auditors that may cause low-quality audit. This supports the negative 
relationship between leverage and audit quality. In fact, larger 
auditors are normally selected to audit the firms with high level of 
equity compared with the firms with the high level of leverage. Based 
on the time-varying adverse selection, this implies the audit quality is 
negatively related to the leverage (Chang et al. 2009). 
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2.4 Total fees 
Asthana and Boone (2012) point out that the auditorÕs expected 
future loss arising from the engagement and the units of audit 
resources expended can affect the auditorÕs expected fees (Simunic, 
1980).  The expected future loss can include the litigation losses and 
government penalties. To total fees that should be paid to auditors, 
there is a popular idea that the behaviour of auditors that receive 
more money from audit clients can potentially reduce the 
independence and objectivity of auditors. Because the behaviour 
implies the auditors have relatively high level of economic 
dependency. For example Magee and Tseng (1990) provide that 
low-balling and price-cutting for audit clients explain that auditors 
may be likely to retain these audit clients, which may reduce the 
independence of auditors and audit quality. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 
show that there is a little of evidence that can support the 
independence of auditors can be negatively influenced by audit clients 
who pay high audit fees. Within the study, the total fees can be acted 
as a proxy for economic dependence.  
 
The total fees that should be paid to auditors include audit fees and 
non-audit fees. The audit fees and non-audit fees are different 
(Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). Firstly, the audit market, during the 
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pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period, is more regulated compared with the 
non-audit market. Secondly, auditors should audit the listed firm, 
which is mandated. However, the listed firm has a choice to decide 
whether the non-audit service is required or not. Lastly, the 
competition is higher for audit market compared with the non-audit 
market (Healy and Palepu, 2003). The Canadian Public Accountability 
Board (CPAB) has found the issue of fee pressures (CPAB, 2010). For 
example, audit clients ask for the reduction of audit fees that are paid 
to audit firms. In other cases, audit firms have to reduce audit fees to 
attract new clients. Normally, audit firms put these fee pressures on 
incumbent auditors, which may contribute to reducing the audit 
quality. The following will provide the literature review on the 
relationship between audit quality and audit fees and non-audit fees 
separately.  
 
 2.4.1 Audit fees 
Larger audit firms (such as Big-Six audit firms) require more 
money to provide auditing and related auditing service compared 
with other smaller audit firms (Ireland and Lennox, 2002). 
Normally, large audit firms (such as Big-Six audit firms) can 
provide high-quality audit. Based on the agency theory, it 
explains the relationship between principals and agents in 
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business, it considers that boards, which are more focusing on 
management, require higher-quality audit that can be as a result 
of higher effort from auditors. Thus higher audit fees should be 
paid to these auditors (Cohen et al. 2004). Srinidhi and Gul (2007) 
mention that audit fees are more likely to reflect the audit effort. 
Knechel and Willekens (2006) prove some evidence to support 
the idea based on the agency theory. Frankel et al. (2002) find 
that there is a negative relationship between unsigned 
discretionary accruals and audit fees. This implies that the 
relationship between audit fees and audit quality is positive (Chen 
and Xia, 2006). Overall, the above reflect that there may be a 
positive relationship between audit fees and audit quality. 
 
However, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) find that the audit fees are not 
significant for abnormal accruals. Recently, auditors take more 
fee pressures. Simunic (1980) provides an explanation between 
audit fees and audit quality. This considers that audit fees can be 
seen as a by-product of a production function. It provides that if 
the firms have stronger governance mechanisms, the audit risk 
will be lower. Thus this can reduce audit effort and audit fees, but 
the audit quality may be improved through the strong internal 
corporate governance mechanisms. This implies that there may 
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be a negative relationship between audit fees and audit quality. 
Moreover, if audited firms are paying more audit fees to audit 
firms, this may increase the economic dependency of audit firms 
on audited firms. The increase of economic dependency may 
reduce the objectivity and independence of audit firms within the 
auditing process. Further, it may reduce the audit quality. This 
supports the negative relationship between audit fees and audit 
quality. 
 
 2.4.2 Non-audit fees  
After major corporate failures (such as Enron scandal), United 
States (U.S.) proposed some restrictions on the non-audit 
services within the SOX 2002 (Reynolds et al. 2004). These 
restrictions on non-audit services are based on the idea that the 
non-audit fees can affect the audit quality (Kinney et al. 2004). 
This will help regulators to control and increase the audit quality. 
Kinney et al. (2004) find that if the audit client requires the 
non-audit services, the auditor can obtain relatively integral 
information for the audit client (such as the information of internal 
system). Thus the extensive information will help the auditor to 
understand the audit client well and to prepare an appropriate 
audit report for the audit client. Further, the non-audit fees can 
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improve the audit quality rather than reduce independence of 
auditors. This supports that the audit quality may be positively 
related to non-audit fees.  
 
However, Frankel et al. (2002) and Nelson (2002) provide that 
there is a positive relationship between non-audit fees and 
absolute discretionary accruals. If the firms have weak corporate 
governance, the discretionary accruals will be positively related to 
the audit fees (Larcker and Richardson, 2004). Normally, it is 
assumed that if the discretionary accruals are higher, the 
earnings quality and audit quality are lower. Thus the positive 
relationship between non-audit fees and absolute discretionary 
accruals implies that non-audit fees are negatively related to the 
audit quality. It is worth noting that the finding from Frankel et al. 
(2002) may be not universal, because Frankel et al. (2002) are 
just using one-year data to obtain the result, which can cause 
idiosyncratic results (Kinney and Libby, 2002; Reynolds et al. 
2004). 
 
It is worth noting that Ashbaugh et al. (2003) prove that the 
non-audit fees have no influence on discretionary accruals. 
Besides, Chung and Kallapur (2003) do not find negative 
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influence of non-audit fees on discretionary accruals, when the 
revenue of audit clients are normalised. Kinney et al. (2004) 
cannot find definitive influence of non-audit fees on restatements. 
If audit quality is high, the possibility of restatements will be low. 
Therefore, the number of restatements can reflect the level of 
audit quality.  
2.5 Big 4 audit firms or not 
Gapper (2011) points out that Big-Four firms including PwC, Deloitte, 
KPMG and E&Y audit 99 percent FTSE 100 and 95 percent FTSE 250. 
It is important to consider the factor of Big 4 auditors. Lawrence et al. 
(2011) summary that ÒThe effects of Big 4 auditors are insignificantly 
different from those of non-Big 4 auditors with respect to three 
audit-quality proxies.Ó The three audit-quality proxies are including 
the discretionary accruals, the en ante cost-of-equity capital, and the 
analyst forecast accuracy. Generally, the audit quality of Big 4 audit 
firms is superior compared with that of non Big 4 audit firms 
(Lawrence et al. 2011, Raman and Wilson, 1994; Teoh and Wong, 
1993). Larger audit firms can provide higher audit quality, because 
they have larger reputations that should be protected (Dopuch and 
Simunic, 1980) and they also want to avoid the costly litigation 
(Khurana and Raman, 2004; DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and Krishnan, 
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1999). Based on the theoretical support of DeAngelo (1981) and 
Dopuch and Simunic (1980), there are some studies find some 
evidence to support that Big 4 audit firms can bring higher-quality 
audit compared with the non-Big 4 audit firms (Palmrose, 1988; 
Khurana and Raman, 2004; Behn et al. 2008). Becker et al. (1998) 
report that the audit clients, who are audited by Big 4 auditors rather 
than non-Big 4 auditors, show lower absolute discretionary accruals. 
The Big 4 auditors may restrict opportunistic and aggressive reporting, 
because the audit clients that are audited by Big 4 auditors have 
higher total accruals and lower discretionary accruals compared with 
the audit clients that are audited by non-Big 4 auditors (Francis et al. 
1999). All of the above imply that audit quality is higher, if the firms 
are audited by Big 4 auditors rather than by non-Big 4 auditors. 
 
Normally, prior studies provide that the Big 4 auditors can bring 
higher-quality audit compared with non Big 4 auditors, because the 
Big 4 firms have larger reputation that should be protected. However, 
Elsenberg and Macey (2004) cannot find any evidence to support that 
the audit quality from Big 4 and Arthur Andersen is different. Besides, 
Khurana and Raman (2004) find that the litigation exposure rather 
than the reputation protection is a reason to encourage Big 4 auditors 
to get high-quality audit. Fuerman (2006) provides that there is no 
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difference on audit quality of Big 4 audit firms and non-Big 4 audit 
firms from 1996 to 1998. Within the study, he analyses the data 
collected from Big 4 and Arthur Andersen. However, he also finds that 
Big 4 firms, from 1999 to 2004, can bring higher-quality audit 
compared with Arthur Andersen. The reason is that the Arthur 
Andersen has systemic and structural defects. But if the Big 4 firms 
are compared separately with Arthur Andersen, the results are not 
entirely supporting the result that Big 4 have higher-quality audit 
compared with non-Big 4. For example, Deloitte that is one of the Big 
4 does not appear to be a higher quality auditor, who may lead to 
higher-quality audit, compared with Arthur Andersen. It is worth 
noting that the overall audit quality for Big 4 and Arthur Andersen has 
declined after following the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PSLR 1995).  
2.6 Audit firm tenure 
Audit firm tenure is the length of years that the firm retains to use the 
same audit firm (Johnson et al. 2002; Carcello and Nagy, 2004). To 
improve the quality of financial reporting, the mandatory audit firm 
rotation that can be added to accounting policy may be acted as a 
solution. In U.S., the SOX were just requiring the mandatory audit 
partner rotation rather than mandatory audit firm rotation. The SOX 
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gave a task to GAO who investigated a research on the effects on 
audit quality from audit firm rotation. It provides ÒMandatory audit 
firm rotation may not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor 
independence and improve audit qualityÓ (GAO, 2003). Based on the 
investigation on the relationship between the type of audit viewpoint 
on the financial statement prior to bankruptcy and the audit firm 
tenure, it provides that audit-reporting failures are more likely 
occurring when the audit firm tenure is shorter. This reminds that the 
auditor should consider the going concern problem within the audit 
procedure.  
 
In the viewpoint of investors, they believe that longer audit tenure 
can result in higher-quality audit (Ghosh and Moon, 2004). Jackson et 
al. (2008) provide some evidence to support the above opinion from 
investors. There are some studies that represent longer audit firm 
tenure contributes to obtaining higher-quality audit (Myers et al. 2003; 
Johnson et al. 2002). For example, Johnson et al. (2002) point out 
that the quality of financial reporting is lower within the short audit 
firm tenure (2 to 3 years) compared with the medium audit firm 
tenure (4 to 8 years). The Carcello and Nagy (2004) support the 
finding of John et al. (2002). The reason for the positive relationship 
between audit firm tenure and audit quality can be that when the 
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audit firm tenure is longer, the auditor may be more likely to restrict 
the firmÕs ability of window dressed earnings that means that the 
presented earnings in financial reporting looks better than the actual 
earnings. Some other studies find that the audit failures are more 
likely to occur in the earlier years of the audit-client relationship 
rather than in the later years of the audit-client relationship (Geiger 
and Raghunanda, 2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Ghosh and Moon, 2005). 
These studies support that the longer audit firm tenure may increase 
the audit quality. Gul et al. (2009) explain that the new auditor 
require much time to know about the client and related industry 
knowledge. It means that the new auditor lack knowledge and 
experience about the client and its industry. But the previous auditor 
has much expertise about the client and its industry, which can help 
the auditor to understand the financial report that should be audited. 
Furthermore, this contributes to obtaining high-quality audit. All of 
the above implies that there may be a positive relationship between 
audit firm tenure and audit quality. 
 
However, Davis et al. (2003) and Castarella et al. (2002) and Francis 
(2004) provide a different viewpoint of the relationship between audit 
firm tenure and audit quality. They find that the discretionary accruals 
increase with a longer audit firm tenure. This means that longer audit 
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firm tenure can decrease audit quality. Overall, the audit quality can 
be lower in the earlier years of the audit-client relationship, because 
the new auditor does not have much knowledge and experience about 
the client. But the audit quality can be lower in the later years of the 
audit-client relationship, because the longer audit firm tenure may 
lead to reducing the objectivity and independence of auditors. It is 
worth to noting that it is more expensive for audit firms and clients to 
change audit firm than change audit partner (Chen et al. 2008). For 
example, if the audited firms require rotating the audit firm, the 
auditor should take much existing resources (such as time and human) 
to understand the client and the audited firm may require helping the 
auditor to know about the firm (such as the internal control system 
and accounting system).  
2.7 Cash from operations 
Bhundia (2012) provide that the cash from operations can be used to 
invest in new fixed asset to maintain current level of operating 
activities, and it also can be distributed as a dividend (or 
share-repurchase) to satisfy the requirements of shareholders. This 
implies that it is inappropriate to consider the ability of a firm that is to 
generate cash flows focused on cash flows from operating activities 
only. Jensen (1989) introduced the free cash flows theory that 
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assumes that the excessive free cash flow can cause over investment 
(Richardson, 2006; Wei and Zhang, 2008). Here the free cash flow is 
the cash flow from operations after deducting the cash that is used to 
invest in some projects of positive net present value. The earnings 
management, which is controlled by managers, is vital for auditors to 
receive information. Therefore, it may generate an important 
influence on audit quality directly (Scott, 1997; Healy and Wahlen, 
1998).  
 
Astami et al. (2012) and Ebrahim (2001) find that the audit quality is 
negatively related to earnings management. The firms with high free 
cash flow allied to low-growth opportunities depended on the agency 
cost theory. This means that managers cannot maximise the 
shareholdersÕ wealth, thus they can use accounting discretion to 
increase earnings in the financial reporting. Normally, managers 
rather than shareholders directly appoint the auditors that should 
agree that the managers could use the accounting discretion to 
increase the earning in the audit report. For example, if the excessive 
free cash flows are low, the managers may want to increase earnings 
for shareholders. This may decrease the audit quality, because the 
independence between the auditor and the manager can be adversely 
influenced. Dechow (1994) points out that there is a negative 
  35 
relationship between cash flows from operating activities and accruals. 
It implies that the audit quality could be positively to cash flows from 
operating activities. 
 
It is worth noting that higher-quality auditors are more likely to report 
errors and irregularities of the audited financial reporting, and they 
are not willing to accept questionable accounting management (Lai, 
2009; Bartov et al. 2001; Gul et al. 2009; Gul et al. 2010; Bliss et al. 
2011). This supports that high-quality audit can moderate the 
relationship between cash flows from operating activities and 
discretionary accruals. There is no evidence can support that the 
importance of clients has a influence on the independence of auditors, 
and the auditors can allow big clients to report more accounting 
discretion (Ebrahim, 2001). The following chapter will design a 
research to investigate the relationship between audit quality and its 
factors. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
This chapter will introduce the methodology that will be used to 
investigate the study about the relationship between audit quality and 
its factors during the financial crisis. Firstly, it is significant to ensure 
a research question. As discussed on the chapter 1, the unexpected 
event (the financial crisis) occurs in recent years, and people are 
increasingly concerned about the topic about financial crisis. 
Therefore, the report designs a research question that whether the 
audit quality can be affected by economic condition crisis. Secondly, it 
will introduce how the sample is selected and collected. Thirdly, the 
regression model will be used as an approach to answer the research 
question. Within the section, it will explain how the dependent 
variable (audit quality) and the independent variables (including the 
audit client size, capital structure of audited firms, audit fees, 
non-audit fees, Big4, audit firm tenure and cash from operations) are 
measured. And then, it will show limitations of the methodology. 
Lastly, the expected results about the relationship between audit 
quality and its factors will be given based on prior studies. 
3.1 Sample collection 
For the study, all of the financial data are from UK companies. As we 
known, the current financial crisis, which was caused by bursting of 
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the housing bubble, began in 2007. The Great Depression was further 
spreading around the global in 2008 (Jickling, 2010). Firstly, it is 
significant to decide which years are required to be selected to reflect 
the period of financial crisis for the report. The following diagram, 
which describes the total return of FTSE All-Share, FTSE 100, FTSE 
250, FTSE SmallCap and FTSE 350 from 2003 to 2013, is helpful to 
select sample. 
 
The diagram 3.1: 10-Year Performance-Total Return (GBP) 
 
(Source: FTSE Factsheet, 2012) 
 
After analysing the above diagram, the tendency of the total return 
from 2003 to 2013 about the FTSE All-Share, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, 
FTSE SmallCap and FTSE 350 is similar. From 2007 to 2009, the total 
return was sharply decreasing to the lowest point, and it was 
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gradually increasing from 2009 to 2011. After 2011, the fluctuation of 
total return is small. This might imply that the decline on total return 
from 2007 to 2009 was severely influenced by the financial crisis that 
is unpredictable, and the negative influence was gradually weakened 
in 2009. Therefore, the study, based on the above analysis, will select 
FTSE 100 from 2007 to 2011 as a sample to investigate the 
relationship between audit quality and its factors. 
 
All of the financial data of the FTSE 100 are from the FAME. Firstly, the 
financial industry will not be considered by the report. The reason is 
that the published financial reporting cannot represent actual revenue 
and losses for financial industry (especially for the bank industry), 
and the accounting requirements are different between financial 
industry and other industries. Therefore, the financial industry and 
other industries are not comparable. Secondly, the date of year-end 
shown in the financial statement is different. Hence, it requires 
selecting a unified year-end date. The report wants to choose five 
years data, thus it is more likely to select 31st December as year-end 
date. Therefore, the companies, whose year-end date is not on 31st 
December, will not be included in the study. Lastly, the company of 
International Airlines Group (IAG), which belongs to the FTSE 100, 
will be excluded by the report. Because the report is going to collect 
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five-years financial data from 2007 to 2011; however, it is impossible 
to collect five-years financial data for the IAG that was formed in 2011. 
It is worth noting that the financial data will be unified in million to 
increase the comparability. The following diagram will describe the 
number of the observations each year. 
 
Diagram 3.2: The number of the left 
companies 
 
FTSE 100 100 
Financial industry (20) 
The year-end date (not 31st December) (32) 
The IAG  (1) 
Left number of the companies  47 
After ensuring the sample, it is important to design a research to 
answer the research question that whether the audit quality can be 
affected by economic condition. To answer the research question, the 
report expects to know the relationship between audit quality and its 
factors from 2007 to 2011 separately. If the relationship between 
audit quality and its factors is different every year, this may support 
that the financial crisis can affect the audit quality. That is to say that 
the economic condition may have an influence on audit quality. 
 
It is worth noting that there are other factors (such as inflation and 
psychological factor) that may affect the economic condition. For the 
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study, it is assumed that the economic condition is only affected by 
the financial crisis. The following will ensure the model that will be 
used to investigate the relationship between audit quality and its 
factors.  
3.2 The direct and indirect measures of audit quality 
There are direct and indirect measures of audit quality. The direct 
measures are normally including the desk reviews (Colbert and 
OÕKeefe, 1995; Westort, 1992), SEC performance (Dechow et al. 
1996), financial reporting compliance with GAAP (Krishnan and 
Schauer, 2000), quality control review (Deis and Giroux, 1992; Deis 
and Giroux, 1996) and bankruptcy. For instance, Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2002) consider that the audit quality can be measured 
as whether the auditor has issued a going-concern qualification in the 
prior year clients that declared bankruptcy. They present that the 
auditor are less likely to issue a going concern option during the initial 
years of engagement rather than in later years of engagement. This 
suggests that long auditor-client relationship can contribute to 
decreasing the audit quality. However, these direct measures are not 
always occurring or available. For example, bankruptcies are not 
often appearing, hence it is impossible to collect the data that are 
related to the bankruptcy. Therefore, the indirect measures of audit 
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quality (including the audit size, auditor tenure, the cost of capital and 
so on) are more frequent used by some studies (Woodland and 
Reynolds, 2003).  
 
Here, the report will select the indirect measures to measure the audit 
quality. Based on the chapter of literature review, there are seven 
indirect measures of audit quality are reviewed. Therefore, the study 
will choose these indirect measures of audit quality to investigate the 
relationship between audit quality and its factors. 
3.3 The regression model 
The regression model is appropriate to research the multivariate 
analysis. Based on the chapter of literature review, the estimated 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can be used as a model to investigate 
the relationship between audit quality and its factors during the 
financial crisis (for example Manry et al. 2003; Wang and Zhou, 2012; 
Chi et al. 2009). For the estimated OLS model, it is important to 
ensure the proxies for audit quality and its factors (including the audit 
client size, capital structure of audited firms, audit fees, non-audit 
fees, Big 4, audit firm tenure and cash from operations). The following 
will provide proxies for audit quality and its factors. 
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 3.3.1 Proxies for audit quality 
The estimated discretionary accruals can be considered as a 
proxy for audit quality and earnings quality (Johnson et al. 2002; 
Myers et al. 2003; Healy, 1985; Dechow et al. 1995; Subranyam, 
1996; Francis et al. 1999; Yu and Francis, 2009; Krishnan, 2003; 
Dechow and Dichev, 2002 and Manry et al. 2003). It is assumed 
that if the estimated discretionary accruals are higher, the audit 
quality is lower. Within a company, the owners and managers are 
different people. Their interests are different, for example the 
managers want to get more bonus rather than to maximise the 
value of shareholders. Healy and Wahlen (1998) write, ÒLoan loss 
reserves for bank and property casualty claim loss reserves are 
highly dependent on managementÕs judgment, are directly 
related to their most critical assets and liabilities.Ó This implies 
that the earnings management can contribute to the 
principal-agency problem that provides the conflict of interests 
between managers and owners. For example, the managers can 
show a window dressed performance through the earnings 
management. To reduce the problem, the auditors are significant 
to provide a high-quality audit that can restrict the high-level 
window dressed performance shown in the financial reporting 
statement (Porter et al. 2008). Due to the simplicity, the Jones 
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model and the modified Jones model are commonly used to detect 
the earnings management and discretionary accruals, (Almeida et 
al. n.d.; Dechow et al. 1995; Young, 1999).  
 
3.3.1.1 The Jones model 
Jones (1991) proposes a model for total accruals to control for 
changes in the economic circumstances of the firm as follows. 
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where: 
TAit is the total accruals for firm i in year t 
Ait-1 is the total assets for firm i in year t-1 
ΔREVit is the change of revenue from year t-1 to year t for firm i 
PPEit is gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t 
εit is the error term for firm i in year t (it represents the 
discretionary accruals) 
 
There are three reasons that he Jones model is used to calculate 
the discretionary accruals. Firstly, the model considers the time 
factor and firm factor. Secondly, it is easy to understand the 
theory that how the discretionary accruals are computed. Lastly, 
it is easy to obtain the all of the required variables within the 
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model.  
 
For the Jones model, the total accruals cannot be directly 
obtained from the financial reporting statement. Following the 
Healy (1985) and Jones (1991), the balance sheet approach can 
be applied to calculate the total accruals as follows. 
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where: 
TAt is the total accruals in year t 
ΔCAt is the change of current assets from year t-1 to year t 
ΔCasht is the change of cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to 
year t 
ΔCLt is the change of current liabilities from year t-1 to year t 
ΔDCLt is the change of debt included in current liabilities from year 
t-1 to year t 
DEPt is the depreciation and amortization in year t 
 
3.3.1.2 The modified Jones model 
To eliminate the conjectured tendency of the Jones model, the 
modified Jones model is designed. The modified Jones model 
removes the receivables from the revenue to eliminate the 
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conjectured tendency. The following shows the modified Jones 
model. 
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where: 
TAit is the total accruals for firm i in year t 
Ait-1 is the total assets for firm i in year t-1 
ΔREVit is the change of revenue from year t-1 to year t for firm i 
ΔRECit is the change of net receivables from year t-1 to year t for 
firm i 
PPEit is gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t 
εit is the error term for firm i in year t (it represents the 
discretionary accruals) 
 
 3.3.2 Proxies for dependent variables 
After ensuring the proxies for audit quality, it is also significant to 
know how to measure the seven dependent variables of audit 
quality (including the audit client size, capital structure of audited 
firms, audit fees, non-audit fees, Big 4, audit firm tenure and cash 
from operations). 
3.3.2.1 Audit client size 
There are many studies using the total assets to measure the 
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audit client size; however, the turnover can be a better proxy for 
audit client size (Pong and Whittington, 1994; Chan et al. 1993). 
The reason is that the total assets may be significantly different 
for similar companies, if these similar companies choose the 
different accounting policy, such as the method of fixed assets 
revaluations, the method of depreciation and goodwill. Compared 
with total assets, the turnover is less influenced by the choice of 
accounting policy and financial structure. Therefore, the study will 
select the turnover to measure the audit client size. It is worth 
noting that the definition of turnover is different between similar 
firms. Here the logarithmic form of turnover will be used to 
measure the audit client size. The natural logarithmic form 
decreases the influence that is mainly caused by the outlier, and it 
also helps to reduce the potential effects of non-linearity. 
 
3.3.2.2 Capital structure of audited firms 
When capital structure is measured, it is significant for 
researchers to consider the total leverage, long-term leverage 
and short-term leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Thus there 
are three types of leverage as follows. 
Total leverage (TL) = book value of total debt/total assets 
Long-term leverage (LTL) = book value of long-term debt/total 
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assets 
Short-term leverage (STL) = book value of short-term debt/total 
assets 
 
Here, the total leverage will be selected to measure the capital 
structure of audited firms, because the total leverage considers 
long-term and short-term debts. Thus, it can integrally display 
the debt-assets relationship. Market value of firm cannot affect 
the debt-assets ratio (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Besides, no 
matter the book value or market value of debt is used, the 
relation between determinants of capital structure and leverage 
will not be influenced (Titman and Wessels, 1988). It is easier to 
get book value compared with market value. Therefore, the book 
value of debt will be selected to compute the leverage. Based on 
the above formula of total leverage and Nagy (2005), the 
leverage for the study will be calculated by total liabilities in year 
t divided by total assets in year t-1. 
 
3.3.2.3 Audit fees & Non-audit fees 
Kinney and Libby (2002) explain that audit fees and non-audit 
fees have influence on independence of auditors, and the both can 
lead to economic bonding. Even though the both can cause 
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economic bonding, the audit fess are more likely reflecting the 
level of audit effort and audit quality rather than the economic 
bonding (Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). Some studies select the ratio of 
non-audit fees to total fees (including audit fees and non-audit 
fees) to measure the economic bond; however, the ratio cannot 
obtain the total economic importance of the client to the auditor 
(Ashbaugh et al. 2003). Reynolds and Francis (2001), Larcker and 
Richardson (2004), Chung and Kallapur (2003) and DeAngelo 
(1981) successfully use the total fees to measure the economic 
bond. Here, the total fees will be divided into audit fees and 
non-audit fees for the study. The audit fees and non-audit fees 
will be transformed into natural logarithmic form to reduce the 
influence that is mainly caused by the outlier and decrease the 
potential effects of non-linearity. 
 
3.3.2.4 Big 4 
The Big 4 is a dummy variable. If the auditor is from a Big 4 audit 
firm, the dummy variable is equal to 1. Otherwise, the dummy 
variable is equal to 0.  
 
3.3.2.5 Audit firm tenure 
If the audit firm tenure is less or equal to 3 years, it is defined as 
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short audit firm tenure. If the audit firm tenure is over 3 years, it 
is defined as long audit firm tenure (Gosh and Moon, 2005; Geiger 
and Raghunandan, 2002). Here, the dependent variable of audit 
firm tenure is a dummy variable. If the same audit firm has 
audited the firm for over 3 years, then the dependent variable will 
be equal to 1. If the firm has been audited by the same audit firm 
for 3 years or less, the dependent variable will be equal to 0. 
 
3.3.2.6 Cash from operations 
Cash from operations can be acted as a measure of the amount of 
cash that are generated by corporate normal business operations. 
It is important to decide whether the firm is able to make 
sufficient cash to maintain and grow its businesses, and it is also 
important to decide the financing structure. For example, if the 
firm does not have sufficient cash generated from the operating 
businesses to support its businesses, the external financing may 
be required. Nagy (2005) describes that the cash from operations 
are the cash from operations in year t divided by total assets in 
year t-1.  
 
Based on the above proxies for the audit quality and dependent 
variables, there are two models related to audit quality (AQ) can be 
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established as follows. 
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where: 
DAJones model is the discretionary accruals based on the Jones model 
DAModified Jones is the discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones 
model 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total revenue in year t 
LEVERAGE is the total liabilities in year t divided by total assets in year 
t-1 
LnAF is the natural logarithm of audit fees 
LnNAF is the natural logarithm of non-audit fees 
Big 4 is a dummy variable; if the firm is audited by Big 4, it is equal to 
1; otherwise it is equal to 0 
TENURE is the audit firm tenure that is a dummy variable; if the firm 
has audited by the same audit firm for over 3 years, it is equal to 1; 
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otherwise it is equal to 0. 
CFO is the cash from operations in year t divided by the total assets in 
year t-1 
3.4 Hypothesis development 
It is important to provide hypothesis development, which can be 
taken as an important step of designing research. Based on the 
chapter of literature review, there are some hypothesis will be 
provided for the report as follows. 
 
H1: Audit client size will have a negative effect on audit 
quality.  
The main reason for the hypothesis that audit client size may have a 
negative effect on audit quality is the economic dependence that 
larger clients can create for their auditors. Especially for the period of 
financial crisis, the auditor may be afraid losing larger clients. The 
economic dependence will generate a negative influence on 
independence and objectivity of the auditor. This implies that the 
audit quality can be negatively influenced by the economic 
dependence that the larger audit clients create. 
 
H2: The leverage will have a positive/negative effect on audit 
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quality. 
Firth and Smith (1992) and DeFond (1992) provide that there is a 
positive relationship between the level of debts and selection of 
auditors with higher reputation. This implies that there is a positive 
relationship between audit quality and leverage. However, Simunic 
and Stein (1987) and Francis and Wilson (1988) point out a different 
viewpoint on the relationship between audit quality and leverage. 
Therefore, the leverage may either negative or positive effect on audit 
quality. 
 
H3: Audit fees will have a negative effect on audit quality. 
During the period of financial crisis, the auditor may be more 
depended on the clients because of the economic dependence. When 
more audit fees are paid to an auditor, the auditor may allow more 
earnings management that contributes to reducing the audit quality. 
Therefore, the higher audit fees will have a negative effect on audit 
quality. 
 
H4: Non-audit fees will have a negative effect on audit quality. 
As the same reason of H3 that audit fees will have a negative effect on 
audit quality, the non-audit fees will have a negative effect on audit 
quality. 
  53 
 
H5: The Big 4 will do not have a positive/negative effect on 
audit quality. 
Based on the past studies, it is difficult to say whether the Big 4 can 
bring higher-quality audit or not. For example, prior studies provide 
that the Big 4 normally can bring higher-quality audit compared with 
non Big 4 auditors; however, Elsenberg and Macey (2004) cannot find 
any evidence to support that the audit quality from Big 4 and Arthur 
Andersen is different. The Fuerman (2006) also provides that there is 
no difference on audit quality of Big 4 audit firms and non-Big 4 audit 
firms from 1996 to 1998. Therefore, the Big 4 may have neither 
negative nor positive effect on audit quality. 
 
H6: Audit firm tenure will have a positive effect on audit 
quality. 
Normally, the longer audit tenure can result in higher-quality audit. It 
is important for audited firms to keep a good relationship with their 
auditors during the period of financial crisis. If the auditor is changed, 
the new auditor requires much time to know about the client and 
related industry knowledge. This may contribute to generating 
low-quality audit, especially for the period of financial crisis. 
Therefore, the audit firm tenure will have a positive effect on audit 
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quality. 
 
H7: Cash flow from operations will have a positive effect on 
audit quality. 
Astami et al. (2012) and Ebrahim (2001) find the audit quality is 
negatively related to earnings management. If the cash from 
operations are high, the managers may do not require much earnings 
management (such as accounting discretion) to increase earnings in 
the financial reporting statement. Dechow (1944) points out that 
there is a negative relationship between cash flows from operating 
activities and accruals. Therefore, cash flow from operations will be 
positive effect on audit quality.  
 
After designing the research, the results will be shown in the next 
chapter. The actual results about the relationship between audit 
quality and its factors will be compared with the expected results that 
are based on literature reviews. Some new findings may be shown in 
the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Data analysis and 
Discussion 
After the above methodology is designed to investigate the 
relationship between audit quality and its factors during the financial 
crisis, there will be some findings. Within the chapter, it is focused on 
the data and result analysis. Firstly, it will describe the characteristics 
of the observed data. Secondly, the regression results will be 
described after describing the data. Thirdly, the test of correlation will 
be applied to detect the correlation among independent variables 
(including the audit client size, capital structure, audit fees, non-audit 
fees, Big 4, firm tenure and cash from operations). If the correlation 
among these independent variables is high, this may negatively affect 
the effectiveness of the regression models. And then, all of the results 
and expected results will be put together, and then the report will 
present an overall analysis for these results. Finally, the limitations of 
the study will be given.  
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4.1 Data analysis 
It is important to know the characteristics of the observed data, 
before the report is going to discuss the regression results. The data 
analysis helps to understand the regression results deeply. Firstly, it 
will describe the characteristics of the observed data from 2007 to 
2011 separately. And then, it will summarise the overall 
characteristics of the data over the five years. To distinguish each 
variable, the following diagram will show some abbreviations for 
dataÕs names. 
 
The diagram 4.1: The abbreviations for variables 
The abbreviation The full name 
MDA The discretionary accruals based on the modified 
Jones method 
DA The discretionary accruals based on the Jones 
method 
SIZE The audit client size that is the natural logarithm of 
total revenue in year t 
LEVERAGE The capital structure of audited firms that is 
measured by the total liabilities in year t divided by 
total assets in year t-1 
LNAF The variable of audit fees is measured by the 
natural logarithm of audit fees 
LNNAF The variable of non-audit service fees is measured 
by the natural logarithm of non-audit service fees 
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BIG4 Whether the firm is audited by Big 4 audit firms or 
not 
FT The audit firm tenure 
CFO The variable of cash from operations is measured 
by the cash flows from operations in year t divided 
by the total assets in year t-1 
 
After rename these variables, the following will explain the 
characteristics of collected data from 2007 to 2011 separately. 
2007 
The diagram 4.2: The summary of the variables in 2007 
The above table summarises variables in 2007. Here, the coefficient 
of variation will be used to observe the degree of variation, and it 
considers the mean and standard deviation together. If its value is 
smaller, the degree of the deviation and risk is smaller, and vice versa. 
To MDA and DA, they almost have the same mean, standard deviation, 
coefficient of variation, minimum and maximum values. This may 
implies that the discretionary accruals based on the method of Jones 
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and modified Jones do not have significant different. Compared with 
other variables, the absolute value of MDA and DAÕs coefficient of 
variation are much higher compared with other variables. This may 
implies that the extreme values are more likely appearing in the data 
set of MDA and DA. Thus these extreme values may cause the 
regression (between MDA (or DA) and independent variables) is 
relatively accurate. The following diagram will describe the variables 
of BIG4 and FT. 
 
The diagram 4.3: BIG4 and FT in 2007 
 
The above diagram shows that the Big 4 audit firms almost audited all 
of the FTSE 100 in 2007. There were only 4% firms that were not 
audited by the Big 4 audit firms. Besides, 79% of firms were going to 
maintain a long-term relationship with their auditors in 2007. This 
could imply the Big 4 audit firms were almost monopolise the UK audit 
market of FTSE 100. 
BIG4 
96% 
NON‐
BIG4 
4% 
BIG4 or not 
LONG‐
TERM 
79% 
SHORT‐
TERM 
21% 
FIRM TENURE 
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2008 
The diagram 4.4: The summary of the variables in 2008 
 
In 2008, compared with other variables, the variable of LNNAF had a 
relatively higher coefficient of variation. Thus, the extreme values 
might be more likely occurring within the data set of LNNAF. The 
following diagrams will summary the BIG4 and FT. 
 
The diagram 4.5: BIG4 and FT in 2008 
 
In 2008, the percentage of firms that were audited by Big 4 audit 
firms reached to 96%. This might imply that FTSE 100 preferred to be 
audited by Big 4 audit firms rather than by non-Big 4 audit firms. The 
BIG4 
96% 
NON‐
BIG4 
4% 
BIG4 or not 
LONG‐
TERM 
87% 
SHORT
‐TERM 
13% 
FIRM TENURE 
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reason might be that the Big 4 audit firms, which have higher 
reputation compared with other audit firms, can provide 
higher-quality audit (Chang et al. 2009). At the same time, the 
percentages of long audit firm tenure were increasing to 87% from 
79%. This might contribute to increasing the degree of monopoly for 
the audit market of FTSE 100.  
2009 
The diagram 4.6: The summary of the variables in 2009 
 
During the year of 2009, there was a higher coefficient of variation for 
the variable of LNNAF, compared with other variables. It means that 
the degree of the deviation for the data set of LNNAF. That is to say, 
the extreme values are more likely occurring within the data set of 
LNNAF, and this may negatively affect the accuracy of regression 
models.  
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The diagram 4.7: BIG4 and FT in 2009 
 
In 2009, the percentage of firms that were audited by Big 4 audit 
firms decreased to 94% from 96%. Even though the percentage was 
decreased by 2%, the Big 4 audit firms still occupied a monopoly for 
the audit market of FTSE 100. The percentages of long audit firm 
tenure were 87% that was the same to the percentage of long audit 
firm tenure in last year. The high degree of monopoly and high 
percentage of long audit firm tenure might have a negative influence 
on independence of auditors. Further, this might reduce the audit 
quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
BIG4 
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NON‐
BIG4 
6% 
BIG4 or not 
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87% 
SHORT‐
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2010 
The diagram 4.8: The summary of the variables in 2010 
 
Within the year of 2010, the coefficients of variation for the variable of 
MDA, DA and LNNAF were 36.345, 36.350 and 25.170 respectively; 
however, the coefficients of variation for other variables were less 
2.000. The higher coefficients of variation for the variable of MDA, DA 
and LNNAF may increase the possibility of extreme values that may 
contribute to increasing the possibility of the unexpected regression 
results. 
 
The diagram 4.9: BIG4 and FT in 2010 
BIG4 
98% 
NON‐
BIG4 
2% 
BIG4 or not 
LONG‐
TERM 
89% 
SHORT‐
TERM 
11% 
FIRM TENURE 
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During the year of 2010, the percentages of firms that were audited 
by Big 4 audit firms were increased to 98% from 94%. Besides more 
and more firms had a long relationship with their auditors from 2009 
to 2010. These might imply that it was difficult to change the high 
audit market concentration of FTSE 100. The high concentration of 
audit market might result in low-quality audit.  
2011 
The diagram 4.10: The summary of the variables in 2011 
 
In 2011, the coefficient of variation for the variable of LNNAF was 
11.190; however, the absolute value of coefficients of variation for 
MDA, DA, SIZE, LEVERAGE, LNAF, and CFO were only 1.977, 1.710, 
0.2782, 0.441, 1.519 and 0.744 respectively. This presented that 
LNNAF had a higher coefficient of variation, compared with other 
variables. It might illustrate that the degree of deviation for the data 
set of LNNAF was relatively higher compared with the degree of 
deviation for other variables.  
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The diagram 4.11: BIG4 and FT in 2011 
 
From 2010 to 2011, there was no change on the percentage of firms 
that were audited by Big 4 audit firms and the percentage of long 
audit firm tenure. This supported that the tendency of monopoly for 
the audit market of FTSE 100 was stable. This might negatively affect 
the independence and objectivity of auditors. 
The overall 
After discussing the characteristics of the observed data from 2007 to 
2011 separately, the section will describe the overall characteristics of 
the observed data over the five years. The number of observation is 
increasing to 235 from 47. It is significant to understand the change 
of the observed data during the period of the financial crisis. The 
following diagram summarises characteristics of these variables from 
2007 to 2011. 
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The diagram 4.12: The summary of the variables over the 5 years 
 
From the above diagram, the coefficient of variation for MDA is the 
highest (its absolute value of the coefficient of variation is 193.449) 
compared with other coefficients of variation for other variables. 
Therefore, it may be vital to consider whether the regression models 
whose dependent variable is MDA are meaningful or not. 
 
The diagram 4.13: The trend chart of BIG4 from 2007 to 2011 
 
The percentage of firms, which are audited by Big 4 audit firms, is 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
BIG4  96%  96%  94%  98%  98% 
92% 
93% 
94% 
95% 
96% 
97% 
98% 
99% 
BIG4 
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gradually increasing to 98% from 2007 to 2011. It is worth noting that 
the percentage was going down to 94% in 2009. It might imply that 
the firm preferred to having a financial statement that could present a 
good financial results rather than obtaining a high-quality audit 
during the period of financial crisis. The reason may be that Big 4 
audit firms are less allowing the occurrence of window dressed  
 
The diagram 4.14: The trend chart of FT from 2007 to 2011 
 
From 2007 to 2011, more and more firms had a long-term 
cooperative relationship with their audit firms. It may imply that FTSE 
100 believes that the Big 4 audit firms have higher audit capabilities. 
The high audit capabilities may help the firm survive during the 
financial crisis, because it may assist the investors to find financial 
problems as soon as possible. Both diagram 13 and diagram 14 reveal 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
LONG AUDIT FIRM 
TENURE 
79%  87%  87%  89%  89% 
74% 
76% 
78% 
80% 
82% 
84% 
86% 
88% 
90% 
FT 
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that the audit market of FTSE 100 has high concentration. The FTSE 
100 is almost audited by Big 4 audit firms, and there is a long-term 
cooperative relationship between FTSE 100 and their audit firms. All 
of these may cause the decline of audit quality, even though the Big 4 
audit firms normally can bring a higher-quality audit compared with 
other audit firms. 
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4.2 The chart analysis 
After understanding the characteristics of variables (including the DA, 
MDA, SIZE, LEVERAGE LNAF, LNNAF, BIG4, FT, CFO), the chart 
analysis will be used to investigate the relationship between DA (or 
MDA) and other variables separately. The analysis is simple and easy 
to understand the relationship between variables. Firstly, the trend 
chart of DA (or MDA) will be used to compare with the trend chart of 
other variables separately. After the comparison, the relationship 
between DA and other variables can be obtained. Lastly, the section 
will summarise and discuss the relationship between DA (or MDA) and 
other variables based on the chart analysis.  
 
There are 47 firms that are included in the sample each year. It is 
difficult to consider which companyÕs data is selected to form the 
trend charts of SIZE, LEVERAGE, LNAF, LNNAF and CFO. Normally, 
the mean can reflect the central tendency of data. Thus, the each year 
mean of SIZE, LEVERAGE, LNAF, LNNAF and CFO can be used to 
obtain these trend charts from 2007 to 2011, which is appropriate. 
The following will represent the relationship between DA (or MDA) and 
SIZE through the comparison between the trend chart of DA (or MDA) 
and SIZE.  
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SIZE 
The diagram 4.15: The trend chart of DA from 2007 to 2011 
 
 
The diagram 4.16: The trend chart of MDA from 2007 to 2011 
 
 
The diagram 4.17: The trend chart of SIZE from 2007 to 2011 
 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
DA  (0.001)  (0.026)  (0.047)  0.003   (0.032) 
(0.050) 
(0.040) 
(0.030) 
(0.020) 
(0.010) 
0.000  
0.010  
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
MDA  (0.001)  (0.026)  (0.047)  0.003   0.068  
(0.060) 
(0.040) 
(0.020) 
0.000  
0.020  
0.040  
0.060  
0.080  
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
SIZE  7.229   7.593   7.541   7.911   8.251  
6.600  
6.800  
7.000  
7.200  
7.400  
7.600  
7.800  
8.000  
8.200  
8.400  
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After comparing the trend chart of DA and SIZE, there are some 
findings. Within the period of 2007 to 2008 and the period of 2010 to 
2011, there is a negative relationship between DA and SIZE. This 
implies that the audit client size increases along with the increase in 
audit quality. When the tendency of DA is decreasing, the value of 
SIZE is almost not changing from 2008 to 2009. This may mean that 
the variable of SIZE may not affect the audit quality from 2008 to 
2009. It may also represent that the decline of economic condition 
can negatively affect the audit quality. Between 2009 and 2010, the 
DA is positively related to the SIZE. This may represent that the audit 
quality is negatively related to the audit client size.  
 
When the modified Jones model is used to measure the audit quality, 
there is a different finding that can be discovered by comparison 
between the trend chart of MDA and SIZE. From 2010 to 2011, the 
MDA is positively related to the SIZE; however, the DA is negatively 
related to the SIZE. Therefore, the audit quality can be negatively 
affected by the audit client size, when the modified Jones model is 
used to calculate discretionary accruals. This may imply that the 
method of calculating discretionary accruals can have an influence on 
relationship between audit quality and audit client size. The following 
will analyse the relationship between DA (or MDA) and LEVERAGE 
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through the comparison between the trend chart of DA (or MDA) and 
LEVERAGE. 
LEVERAGE 
The diagram 4.18: The trend chart of LEVERAGE from 2007 to 2011 
 
During the period of 2007 to 2011, the leverage is fluctuant. This may 
imply that the financing strategy is always changing over the period, 
because the firm may face many financial problems during the 
financial crisis. Compared the trend chart of DA and LEVERAGE, there 
is a positive relationship between discretionary accruals and leverage 
from 2008 to 2011. However, during the period of 2007 to 2008, the 
leverage is negatively related to the discretionary accruals. This 
revels that the leverage increases along with the increase in audit 
quality from 2007 to 2008, and after 2008 the relationship between 
audit quality and leverage is different.  
 
When the trend charts of MDA and LEVERAGE are considered together, 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
LEVERAGE  0.642   0.721   0.516   0.613   0.609  
0.000  
0.100  
0.200  
0.300  
0.400  
0.500  
0.600  
0.700  
0.800  
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the discretionary accruals are negatively related to the leverage from 
2007 to 2008 and 2010 to 2011. From 2008 to 2010, there is a 
positive relationship between discretionary accruals and leverage. It 
shows that there is a positive relationship between audit quality and 
leverage during the period of 2007 to 2008 and 2010 to 2011, and 
there is the negative relationship from 2008 to 2010. This may 
illustrate that when the financial crisis is aggravating, the audit 
quality can be negatively influenced by high leverage. The following 
will discuss the relationship between DA (or MDA) and LNAF through 
the comparison between the trend chart of DA (or MDA) and LNAF. 
LNAF 
The diagram 4.19: The trend chart of LNAF from 2007 to 2011 
 
By comparison between the trend chart of DA and LNAF, the 
discretionary accruals are normally negatively related to the audit 
fees. This reveals that the audit fees can positively affected the audit 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
LNAF  0.631   0.924   0.913   0.750   0.815  
0.000  
0.100  
0.200  
0.300  
0.400  
0.500  
0.600  
0.700  
0.800  
0.900  
1.000  
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quality. It is worth noting that even though the audit fees do not 
change from 2008 to 2009, the audit quality is gradually increasing. 
This may because that the factor of audit fees is not a major factor 
that has an influence on audit quality in the early financial crisis.  
 
When the discretionary accruals can be calculated by the modified 
Jones method, it is positively related to the audit fees. That is to say 
that audit quality is decreasing accompanied by the increase in audit 
fees. The result may because that the coefficient of variation of MDA 
is much higher than that of DA. The following will discuss the 
relationship between DA (or MDA) and LNNAF through the comparison 
between the trend chart of DA (or MDA) and LNNAF. 
LNNAF 
The diagram 4.20: The trend chart of LNNAF from 2007 to 2011 
 
Apart from the period of 2008 to 2009, the relatinsihp between DA 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
LNNAF  0.189   0.424   0.215   0.049   0.119  
0.000  
0.050  
0.100  
0.150  
0.200  
0.250  
0.300  
0.350  
0.400  
0.450  
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and LNNAF is negative within other periods. That is to say that the 
audit quality is almost positively related to the non-audit servive fees 
from 2007 to 2011 (excluding the period of 2008 to 2009).  
 
Through the comparison between the trend charts of MDA and LNNAF, 
the relationship between MDA and LNNAF is always floating from 2007 
to 2011. This may imply that it is difficult to ensure the relationship 
between audit quality and non-audit service fees during the period of 
financial crisis. Therefore, when the factor of non-audit service fees is 
considered how it affects the audit quality, it also requires considering 
other factors (such as audit client size, leverage and Big 4). By 
comparison between the trend charts of DA (or MDA) and LNNAF, 
there will be some findings between the relationship between DA (or 
MDA) and LNNAF in the following section. 
CFO 
The diagram 4.21: The trend chart of CFO from 2007 to 2011 
 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
CFO  0.115   0.147   0.117   0.151   0.150  
0.000  
0.020  
0.040  
0.060  
0.080  
0.100  
0.120  
0.140  
0.160  
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Based on the Jones model, the discretionary accruals are normally 
positively related to the cash flows from operations from 2008 to 2011. 
Thus the audit quality is negatively related to the cash flow from 
operation. The high level of cash flows from operations may represent 
that the mangers have a high influence on cash flows by accounting 
discretion, and the auditors may be more likely to allow high level of 
window dressed earnings within the firm. This supports the negative 
relationship between the audit quality and cash flows from 
operations. 
 
Based on the modified model, it is difficult to ensure the relationship 
between audit quality and cash flows from operations. Because the 
relationship between discretionary accruals and cash flows from 
operations is always changing from 2007 to 2011. This finding may 
suggest that the high degree of deviation for the set of data about 
MDA should be considered. The following will analyse the relationship 
between DA (or MDA) and BIG4 by the comparison between the trend 
charts of DA (or MDA) and BIG4. 
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BIG4 
The diagram 4.22: The trend chart of BIG4 from 2007 to 2011 
 
within the section, the BIG4 represents that the percentage of firms 
that are audited by Big 4 audit firms. During the period of financial 
crisis, the audit market concentration of Big 4 is very high. When the 
marekt concentration is high, the tendency of discretioanry accruals 
that are calcualted by the Jones model and modified Jones model are 
not stable from 2007 to 2011. Hence, the factor of BIG4 may be not 
related to the audit quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
BIG4  96%  96%  94%  98%  98% 
92% 
93% 
94% 
95% 
96% 
97% 
98% 
99% 
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FT 
The diagram 4.23: The trend chart of FT from 2007 to 2011 
 
For the section, the FT represents the percentage of long audit firm 
tenure. The above diagram shows that the percentage of long audit 
firm tenure is gradually increasing from 2007 to 2011. It can imply 
that more and more firms have a long-term cooperative relationship 
with their audit firms. From the above diagram 15 and 16, the 
tendency of DA and MDA does not disciplinary over the period of 2007 
to 2011. Therefore, there may be no relationship between the audit 
quality and audit firm tenure. The following section will summarise 
results based on the chart analysis. 
Summary of results 
In this section, it will summarise results from the above analysis. The 
diagram 24 shows the summary of results based on the chart analysis. 
Based on different methods that are used to calculate the 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
LONG AUDIT FIRM 
TENURE 
79%  87%  87%  89%  89% 
74% 
76% 
78% 
80% 
82% 
84% 
86% 
88% 
90% 
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discretionary accruals, the different results about the relationship 
between discretionary accruals and other variables can be obtained. 
The following diagram represents the summary of results.  
 
The diagram 4.24: The summary of results based on the chart 
analysis 
 DA MDA 
SIZE Positive/Negative Positive/Negative 
LEVERAGE Positive/Negative Positive/Negative 
LNAF Negative  Positive  
LNNAF Negative Insignificant  
BIG4 Insignificant Insignificant 
FT Insignificant Insignificant 
CFO Positive  Insignificant 
Even though the chart analysis can help people intuitively know the 
relationship between DA (or MDA) and its variables, it does not 
consider the mutual influence between the variables. The regression 
analysis considers the mutual influence between the variables. 
Therefore, the results from regression analysis can be more accurate 
compared with the results from the chart analysis. The following 
section will discuss the regression results. 
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4.3 Regression analysis 
To regression models, the data analysis and chart analysis contribute 
to understanding the characteristics of independent and dependent 
variables deeply. The following will discuss the regression results from 
2007 to 2011 separately, and then it will analyse the overall 
regression that considers 5 yearsÕ data. For the dependent variable 
(audit quality), two models that are Jones model and modified Jones 
model will be used to calculate the discretionary accruals, which can 
be taken as a proxy for audit quality. For the regression model, the 
audit quality is dependent variable, and the independent variables 
SIZE, LEVERAGE LNAF, LNNAF, BIG4, FT and CFO. The following 
diagrams (from diagram 25 to diagram 29) represent the regression 
results from 2007 and 2011.  
2007 
The diagram 4.25: The regression results in 2007 
 DA MDA 
SIZE Insignificant Insignificant 
LEVERAGE Positive Positive 
LNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
LNNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
BIG4 Insignificant Insignificant 
FT Insignificant Insignificant 
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CFO Insignificant Insignificant 
Based on the STATA result (see the Appendix 1), the discretionary 
accruals are positively related to the level of leverage in 2007. After 
looking at the STATA result, only the p value for the LEVERAGE is less 
than 0.05. Therefore, only the factor of LEVERAGE is significant for 
discretionary accruals. This implies that there is a negative 
relationship between the audit quality and the level of leverage in 
2007. 
2008 
The diagram 4.26: The regression results in 2008 
 DA MDA 
SIZE Insignificant Insignificant 
LEVERAGE Insignificant Insignificant 
LNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
LNNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
BIG4 Insignificant Insignificant 
FT Insignificant Insignificant 
CFO Insignificant Insignificant 
Based on the STATA result (see the Appendix 2), there is no 
relationship between the discretionary accruals and its independent 
variables. That is to say, there is no evident to support that the audit 
quality can be affected by these seven independent variables in 2008. 
 
  81 
2009 
The diagram 4.27: The regression results in 2009 
 DA MDA 
SIZE Insignificant Insignificant 
LEVERAGE Insignificant Insignificant 
LNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
LNNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
BIG4 Insignificant Insignificant 
FT Insignificant Insignificant 
CFO Negative Negative 
After analysing the STATA result (see the Appendix 3), CFO has a 
negative relationship with the discretionary accruals. Because only 
the p value for the CFO is less than 0.05, which represents the factor 
of CFO is significant. This illustrates that the audit quality increases 
along with the increase in CFO in 2009. 
2010 
The diagram 4.28: The regression results in 2010 
 DA MDA 
SIZE Insignificant Insignificant 
LEVERAGE Insignificant Insignificant 
LNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
LNNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
BIG4 Insignificant Insignificant 
FT Insignificant Insignificant 
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CFO Insignificant Insignificant 
After considering the STATA result (see the Appendix 4), it shows that 
the audit quality is not associated with the seven independent 
variables in 2010, because all of the p values for these independent 
variables are more than 0.05. 
2011 
The diagram 4.29: The regression results in 2011 
 DA MDA 
SIZE Insignificant Positive 
LEVERAGE Insignificant Insignificant 
LNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
LNNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
BIG4 Insignificant Insignificant 
FT Insignificant Insignificant 
CFO Insignificant Insignificant 
When the discretionary accruals are calculated by Jones model, it 
does not have a relationship with its independent variables. However, 
when the discretionary accruals are calculated by modified Jones 
model, it is positively associated with SIZE. That is to say that audit 
quality is negatively related to the audit client size (see the Appendix 
5). The above regression results (shown in diagram 29) may imply 
that the method that is used to measure the audit quality can affect 
the regression results. The following diagram 20 will show results of 
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regression that considers all of the data from 2007 to 2011. 
The overall 
The diagram 4.30: The regression results over the 5 years  
 DA MDA 
SIZE Insignificant Insignificant 
LEVERAGE Insignificant Insignificant 
LNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
LNNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
BIG4 Insignificant Insignificant 
FT Insignificant Insignificant 
CFO Negative Insignificant 
Based on the STATA result (see the Appendix 6), if the Jones model is 
used to calculate the discretionary accruals, there will be a negative 
association between discretionary accruals and CFO. However, there 
is no relationship between discretionary accruals and CFO, if the 
modified Jones model is used to compute the discretionary accruals 
that are negatively related to the audit quality. The following section 
will summarise the overall results based on the above regression 
analysis. 
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Summary of results 
The diagram 4.31: The overall results based on regression analysis 
 DA MDA 
SIZE Insignificant Positive 
LEVERAGE Positive Positive 
LNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
LNNAF Insignificant Insignificant 
BIG4 Insignificant Insignificant 
FT Insignificant Insignificant 
CFO Negative Negative 
The above diagram concludes the overall results based on the 
regression analysis. It is significant to consider the correlation 
between independent variables to avoid the multicollinearity. If the 
correlation between independent variables is high, this will negatively 
affects the accuracy of the expected regression model. For example, 
the estimated coefficients cannot represent appropriate association 
between dependent and independent variables. The following section 
will analyse the correlation between independent variables. 
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4.4 The correlation between independent variables 
In this section, it aims to investigate the correlation between 
independent variables. Normally, if the coefficient of correlation 
between independent variables is over 0.75, this can be considered as 
high correlation between them. High coefficient of correlation can lead 
to the multicollinearity. The following diagram just shows these 
coefficients of correlation between independent variables that are 
around 0.75. 
 
The diagram 4.32: The correlation between independent variables 
 LNAF20071 LNAF2008 LNAF2011 LNAF2  
LNNAF20073 0.7302    
LNNAF2008  0.8652   
LNAF2011   0.7515  
LNNAF    0.7409 
From the above diagram, the coefficients of the correlation between 
LNAF and LNNAF are high. This implies that the correlation between 
LNAF and LNNAF is relatively high. Thus the multicollinearity can be 
caused by the high correlation between them. The multicollinearity 
can result in a low R-squared value. The R-squared value can be 
considered as an indicator that represents the goodness of fit for the 
                                                        
1  LNAF2007, LNAF2008, LNAF2011 mean the variable of LNAF in 2007, 2008 and 2011 respectively   
2  LNAF and LNNAF mean the variable of LNAF and LNNAF over the 5 years 
3  LNNAF2007, LNNAF2008, LNNAF2011 mean the variable of LNNAF in 2007, 2008, 2011 respectivley 
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trend line. The higher the value is, the higher the goodness of fit is. If 
the goodness of fit is higher, the trend line will be more reliable. Based 
on the STATA result (see the Appendix 1, 2, 5 and 6), the R-squared 
values are relatively low. The low R-squared value, which shows the 
low goodness of fit, may cause that the regression results are not 
appropriate. After considering the correlation between independent 
variables, the following will discuss the above results that are from 
the chart analysis and regression analysis, and it will also combine 
these actual results and expected results. 
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4.5 Discussion 
In this section, it will firstly summarise the expected and actual 
results about the relationship between audit quality and its factors 
(including the audit client size, capital structure, audit fees, non-audit 
service fees, Big 4, firm tenure and cash from operations). The actual 
results are based on the regression and chart analysis. And then the 
expected results will be compared with the actual results. After 
comparison, it will discuss the same and different between expected 
and actual results. Finally, there will be some new findings that are 
discovered by the report. The following diagram will illustrate the 
expected results and actual results. 
 
The diagram 4.33: The summary of the expected results and actual 
results  
Variables Expected The regression 
analysis 
The chart analysis 
AQ (DA)4 AQ 
(MDA)5 
AQ (DA) AQ (MDA) 
SIZE - X - +/- +/- 
LEVERAGE +/- - - +/- +/- 
LNAF - X X - + 
LNNAF - X X - X 
                                                        
4  AQ (DA) means the discretionary accruals based on the Jones model as the proxy for audit quality 
5  AQ (MDA) means the discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model as the proxy for audit 
quality 
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BIG4 X X X X X 
FT + X X X X 
CFO + + + + X 
(Ô+Õ means the positive relationship; Ô-Õ means the negative 
relationship; ÔXÕ means there is no relationship between two 
variables) 
The comparison 
This section will compare the expected results and actual results that 
are based on the regression and chart analysis. The following diagram 
will express the results after comparison between the expected and 
actual results.  
 
The diagram 4.34: The results by the comparison 
Variables The regression 
analysis 
The chart analysis 
AQ (DA) AQ (MDA) AQ (DA) AQ (MDA) 
SIZE D S ? ? 
LEVERAGE ? ? S S 
LNAF D D S D 
LNNAF D D S D 
BIG4 S S S S 
FT D D D D 
CFO S S S D 
(ÔDÕ means the actual result is the same to the expected result; ÔSÕ 
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means the actual result is different from the expected result; Ô?Õ 
means that the actual result may be the same to the expected or may 
be different from the expected result) 
 
After comparison between the expected findings and the actual 
findings based on the regression analysis, there may be a major 
reason for the same findings between expected and actual results. 
The expected results are based on the previous literatures. The 
estimated OLS, which are normally used by previous researchers, is 
selected by the report as the methodology. The same findings may be 
as a result of the same methodology that is used to investigate the 
relationship between audit quality and its factors. 
 
There are some reasons that may explain why the expected findings 
and the actual findings are different. Firstly, the audit quality maybe 
not has a linear relation with the seven independent variables. 
However, the report assumes a linear relation. Secondly, the period of 
collecting financial data is different, so that the results maybe 
different. Because the financial market situation, within the different 
period, is different. Thirdly, method that is used to measure variables 
is different. For example, the audit client size can be measured by the 
natural logarithm of total revenue, it can also be calculated by the 
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natural logarithm of total assets. Finally, the sample size of the report 
is small, thus it is difficult offset the influence of abnormal financial 
data.  
New findings 
After the above analysis, there are two major findings. Firstly, the 
economic conditions may affect the audit quality. The report aims to 
investigate the relationship between audit quality and its factors 
during the financial crisis. After analysis, it can find that the 
relationship between audit quality and its factors is different for every 
year during the period of 2007 to 2011. This may support that the 
economic conditions (such as the period of financial crisis) can affect 
the audit quality. Lastly, the method that can be used to measure the 
discretionary accruals may have an influence on the relationship 
between audit quality and its factors. Because the relationship 
between audit quality and its factors is different, when the Jones 
model and modified Jones model are separately used to measure the 
audit quality. 
4.6 Limitations of the study 
There are some limitations for the study. Firstly, there are inherent 
limitations for the use of a sample. For example, the FTSE 100 is 
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selected as a sample for the report that aims to investigate the 
relationship between audit quality and its factors during the financial 
crisis. If the report considers a wider sample, the different findings 
may be found. Secondly, the study uses the discretionary accruals as 
a proxy for audit quality. In addition to the abnormal accruals, the 
earnings related to cash flow can also be used to measure the audit 
quality (Burgstahler et al. 2004). Chung and Kallapur (2003) provide 
that the discretionary accruals can be used to measure the audit 
quality, which can be problematic. Lastly, the non-linear accruals 
model can be a better model to measure the audit quality than the 
linear model of Jones (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006). 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
The report is going to explore whether the economic condition can 
affect the audit quality based on comparison of the relationship 
between audit quality and its factors from 2007 to 2011 separately. 
The following gives two recommendations for future research about 
the study. Lastly, it will conclude the conclusion.  
5.1 The recommendation one for future research 
It is worth noting that the R-squared value for the regression models 
is not high. This may remind that the other researchers require 
considering more variables that can affect the audit quality to 
optimise the regression models that are established by the report in 
future. Here the report recommends that the variable of auditor 
tenure and the seven variables that are mentioned in the report can 
be considered together to create a new regression model. Because 
the variable of auditor tenure is gradually being taken seriously.  
 
After U.S. accepted the SOX, there were many other countries 
following the mandatory audit partner rotation, such as the European 
Union, United Kingdom and so on (Manry et al. 2003). 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) changed the audit partner rotation from 
seven years to five years. The Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 
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also increased the cooling-off period from two years to five years 
(Daugherty et al. 2013). The provision of mandatory audit partner 
rotation could take a new eye on the client risk engagement issues, 
thus it would increase the audit independence. However, it could 
decrease the client-specific knowledge. Even though the relocation 
caused from the partner rotation is an issue, the major problem as a 
result of the partner rotation was lack of client-specific knowledge. 
Generally, partners should take 2.5 years to completely understand a 
client and to take an effective audit reporting.  
 
The U.S. Senate began to consider that whether audit firm rotation 
could improve audit quality after the Enron financial scandal and the 
failure of Andersen. The SOX [2002] was passed and the Congress 
indicated that there were potential benefits for a financial issuer when 
the issuer uses a new auditor Òwith fresh and skeptical eyesÓ (U.S. 
Senate, 2002). Within the report of Chi et al. (2005), the audit quality 
was measured by absolute and signed abnormal accruals and 
abnormal working capital accruals. They discovered that the 
companies who accepted the mandatory audit partner rotation could 
have higher audit quality compared with the companies who did not 
accept the mandatory audit partner in 2004. Nagy (2005) found that 
the discretionary was positively related to the audit firm tenure for 
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small companies, but the finding was pointed out under a turbulent 
period such as the Enron financial scandal and the failure of Andersen. 
Therefore, the finding may not be representative. 
 
However, the shorter audit tenure could lead to lower audit quality. 
With longer audit firm tenure, the client can get a more reliable 
audited financial reporting (Ghosh and Moon, 2005). For example, the 
Public Oversight Board, the Commission on AuditorsÕ Responsibilities 
and the National Commission found that audit failures are more likely 
occurring in the first two years of a client-audit firm relationship 
(AICPA, 2003). The report from Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) and 
Carcello and Nagy (2004) also found that the audit reporting failures 
were more likely appearing in the earlier years of the client-audit firm 
relationship. Besides the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that 
it would be difficult to predict the mandatory audit firm rotationÕs 
potential benefits that are improving auditor independence and audit 
quality, because there are additional costs and the misunderstanding 
from the new auditor (GAO, 2003).  
 
Johnson et al. (2002) found that compared with the medium 
client-audit firm relationships, the financial reportsÕ quality with the 
short client-audit firm relationships would be lower. Here the absolute 
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value of discretionary accruals was used as a measure of audit quality. 
Under the controlling for client size and engagement risk, Manry et al. 
(2003) suggested that there was a positive relationship between audit 
quality and partner tenure for small clients; however, there was no 
relationship between them for large clients. Their report focused on 
the individual audit partners rather than audit firms focused by the 
other reports. However, Daugherty et al. (2013) pointed out that 
mandatory audit partner rotation could bring an indirect and negative 
impact on audit quality. There was a negative relationship between 
audit quality and tenure (Mansi et al. 2004). It is worth noting that the 
capital structure should be considered. 
 
All of the above provides an overview on the relationship between 
audit quality and auditor tenure. These support that the auditor 
tenure can have a significant influence on audit quality based on large 
number of previous literatures. Therefore, if the auditor tenure is 
considered in future, this may contribute to obtaining relative 
accurate findings about the relationship between audit quality and its 
factors. The report dose not considers the variable of auditor tenure, 
because there are large numbers of data about the auditor tenure that 
are not available from 2007 to 2011. 
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5.2 The recommendation two for future research 
In previous studies, the discretionary accruals are normally 
considered as a proxy for the audit quality. The different people can 
have a different viewpoint on the definition of the audit quality. 
Therefore, it may be not appropriate to measure the audit quality by 
abnormal accruals. The audit quality can be influenced by the 
behaviour of the auditor. The behaviour of the human can be caused 
by the psychological factor. The subject of the report is to investigate 
the relationship between audit and its factors during the financial 
crisis. During the period of the financial crisis, the psychology of the 
auditors is changing. The change of the psychology can cause the 
change of the auditorÕs behaviour that can affect the audit quality. 
Therefore, the psychology factor can be considered in further study to 
investigate the relationship between the audit quality and its factors 
during the financial crisis. 
 
The idea of behavioural finance helps the report to consider factors 
that affect audit quality from the viewpoint of psychology. Shefrin 
(2000) provides Òbehavioural finance is the application of psychology 
to finance behaviour Ñ the behaviour of practitioners.Ó In my opinion, 
the behavioural finance can be used to explain some behaviours that 
affect audit quality within the audit process. The behavioural finance 
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is normally related to cognitive biases, frame dependence bias, 
herding behaviour and prospect theory (Taffler et al. 2009; 
Muradoglu et al. 2008; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1979). The following will explain how behavioural finance 
affects audit quality based on cognitive biases and prospect theory.  
 
Cognitive biases 
Within an audit, the individual characteristics may generate some 
influence on audit quality. The cognitive biases normally affect 
the auditorsÕ behaviour and judgments. First of all, some 
incentives have adverse influence on auditor judgments that can 
reduce audit quality, such as risk of client loss and fee pressure 
(Farmer et al. 1987; Houston, 1999; Blay, 2005 and Gramling, 
1999). This behaviour may be caused by cognitive biases that 
cause negative change on psychology of auditors. And then, 
Taffler et al. (2009) provides that the people always make a 
decision relied on the heuristics or rules of thumb. This may 
contribute auditors to making more appropriate decisions on old 
clients than on new clients, because, auditors have much more 
specific knowledge and experience on old clients than on new 
clients. For example, Chen et al. (2009) show that professional 
skepticism is positively related to the audit quality. Besides, a 
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large number of specific knowledge can produce a high-quality 
auditor judgment, which contributes to improving audit quality 
(Bonner, 1990). Finally, the pressures from the audit firm can 
affect the auditor judgments, because these pressures may result 
in the change of auditorsÕ psychology. For example, the pressures 
of time-budget may cause some behaviour to reduce audit quality 
(Knechel et al. 2013). For example, auditors may ignore some 
misstatements of financial reporting to meet the time-budget. 
The auditorsÕ judgments are easily influenced by cognitive biases, 
because the circumstance is uncertain within the audit process 
and audit outcomes (Knechel et al. 2013). 
 
Prospect theory 
To finance, prospect theory describes that investors preferred to 
avoid loss rather than to maximise margin (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1979). This may imply that people prefer to avoid risk. 
The psychology may cause the possibility that auditor overstates 
the audit risk. The behaviour may increase audit quality. This may 
because that if auditors overstate audit risk, they will spend more 
time and effort to audit the clientÕs accounting system and 
financial reports. 
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In order to investigating the relationship between audit quality and its 
factors through the idea of behaviour finance, there will be requiring 
more effort to understand how to explain the behaviour that helps to 
improve the audit quality based on the behavioural finance.  
5.3 Conclusion of the conclusion 
In addition to the variable of Big 4 and firm tenure, the other variables 
can affect the audit quality based on the chart analysis. However, 
there are only three variables of audit client size, capital structure and 
cash from operations that have an influence on audit quality based on 
the regression analysis. The report obtains two main findings based 
on the sample that are collected from the FTSE 100 market. The first 
is the economic conditions may have an influence on the audit quality. 
The second is that the method that can be used to measure the 
discretionary accruals may affect the relationship between audit 
quality and its factors. The report contributes to increasing the 
research perspective to investigate the relationship between audit 
quality and its factors. The reason is that the factor of economic 
conditions are taken into account by the report, however, no study 
considers the economic conditions in prior studies. 
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